![]() Objects exist in a derived and less fundamental sense. These things exist but not as features that make up ultimate reality. The Classical Theist, however, denies this. The Naturalist is then committed to the existence of composites (act and potency compounds) as features making up ultimate reality. Generally, for naturalists, all objects of our experience, such as humans, houses, and stars, are part of ultimate reality. By ‘ultimate reality’, we simply mean the correct account of the nature of everything or of all being that exists at the highest degreed level of reality. Traditionally, ultimate reality is what is of concern in the debate between theism and naturalism. Having said all of this, we can now see why the Classical Theist (at least of the stripe mentioned) shouldn't be convinced by Oppy's argument. These essences can be said to exist, but they exist to some lesser degree. Essences which come to exist in this way, can be said to have derivative existence. Unless one's essence is to exist, one's essence has to come together with existence and participate in it. (For example, the Classical Theist thinks that Pikachu has an essence, but yet, lacks existence.) Existence is what is fundamental to ultimate reality. 3 3 For independent reasons as to why one should prefer this metaphysical view, see Gaven Kerr ( 2015). Classical Theists think that behind all change is ultimately being that is simply pure act.īy a participatory metaphysics, we have in mind the view that there is a distinction between existence or esse, and essence. Potentialities (coldness, hotness, sharpness, dullness, roundness, flatness, etc.) are real features of objects (coffee, pencils, balls, etc.) that have yet to be actualized. For example, the coffee on Mike's desk is warm, but it has the potential to be cold (say, if Mike let's it sit on his desk overnight), or the potential to be boiling hot (perhaps Mike rewarms it in the microwave for too long). The familiar potency-act distinction distinguishes between the way things are and the way things could potentially be. The proponent of the type of Classical Theism that we have in mind is going to endorse the potency and act distinction, she is going to endorse a participatory metaphysics, and she's going to think that existence comes in degrees. Classical Theist shouldn't find Oppy's argument from simplicity compelling. What we are doing rather, is arguing that a very specific type of theist who assumes the relevant metaphysical doctrines, shouldn't find Oppy's argument compelling. We don't need to argue that Classical Theism entails the theses we go on to explicate. ![]() We argue still, that the already committed 2 2 Notice here, our argument is rather narrow. While this second assumption doesn't compart with our intuitions about simplicity, we assume it for the sake of argument. And let's even grant that postulating a multiverse in order to accommodate fine-tuning is ontologically simpler than a hypothesis that postulates God and one universe at the level of ultimate reality. That is, in comparing hypothesis 1 over hypothesis 2, all things equal, whichever hypothesis endorses a more modest ontology should be preferred. We take it that ontological simplicity is important. 1 1 Even if the relevant simplicity here is conceptual simplicity, having less ontological baggage will still be primarily responsible for why the hypothesis in question is conceptually clear. Let's grant that theoretical simplicity is determined, at least largely, by metaphysical simplicity. (Ibid.) Thus, all things being equal, via Ockham's Razor, one should favor naturalism over theism. As Oppy proceeds to explain, while naturalism is committed to: (1) an account of the natural universe and (2) the natural universe is all that exists theism, in contrast, is committed to (1) plus (2*) there exists a theistic realm, and (3) the natural realm and the theistic realm are all that exists.
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